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1. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Does a solicitor who misappropriates a trust fund in breach of trust 
render his partners, having no actual knowledge of the events, liable to 
account to the beneficiaries for the loss of the fund? In Blyth 
1 
v. Fl adgate , 
decided in 1891, it was held that a solicitor who had dealt with a trust fund 
in breach of trust rende red all his partners liable as constructive trustees. 
2 
In Mara v. Browne in 1896 three judges of the Court of Appeal expressed the 
opinion, obiter, that eve n if one partner was held liable as constructive 
trustee for his dealings with a trust fund, the other members of the partnership 
would not be liable if they were without actual knowledge of the misapplication. 
There was no further judicial statement on this question for over eighty years, 
3 
until the decision of Vinelott J. in Re Bell's Indenture, Hickley v. Bell in 
1979. Vinelott J., applying the dicta in Mara, decided that a partner, who 
was liable as a constructive trustee for misapplication of a trust fund, did 
not render his innocent partners liable as constructive trustees or under 
sections 10 and 11 of the Partnership Act 1890 (U.K.). Re Bell is of interest 
for two main reasons. First, it has resolved an apparent conflict between two 
cases decided over eighty years ago, and is therefore of interest as to the 
manner of that resolution. Secondly, the decision itself is of interest as a 
matter of substantive law. 
The object of this paper is threefold. First,it is proposed to examine 
the authoritative basis of the decision itself. Secondly,the decision will 
be examined in the con text of constructive trusts imposed on transferees and 
agents. Finally,it is proposed to discuss whe ther the dec ision in Re Bell 
is generally consistent with recent trends in the whole area of constructive 
trusts in English law. 
\ .. - - ..., . 
2. 
rr. INTRODUCTION TO CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 
Four types of trust exist
4 
- the express trust, the resulting trust, the 
implied trust, and the constructive trust . The express 
trust arises where the 
settlor by express statement intentionally creates a rel
ationship of trustee 
and beneficiary . The implied trust and resulting trust 
both occur where the 
settlor carries out some other transaction from which th
e court infers the 
relationship of trustee and beneficiary . The settler ma
kes no express statement 
of intention, but the settler's intention is inferred fro
m the circumstances . 
A constructive trust arises where the court imposes on c
ertain persons a 
relationship of trustee and beneficiary as the result of
 their conduct or 
knowledge . This relationship arises totally independen
tly of the intention 
of any of the parties
5 • 
Since the constructive trust is impos ed by th~ court, th
e vital task is 
to define the circumstances in which the court will impo
se the trust. 
Definition of these circumstances has been carried out b
y a process of 
separation and development of categories of liability, r
ather than by a 
statement of general principle. One of these categories
 results in a constructive 
trust being imposed on a stranger who has dealt with or 
received property 
which has come into his hands as the result of a breach o
f fiduciary duty. 
Re Bell falls into this category. 
Definition of the detail of the categories of constructi
ve trusts has 
presented some problems. In order to introduce the type
 of question that will 
be discussed later in this paper, it is proposed to outl
ine two of the problems 
that have been encountered in the imposition of construc
tive trusts on 
transferees or agents. 
First , a problem has arisen as to the degree of knowledg
e of the original 
wrongdoing and/or existence of a trust that is required 
by the stranger to 
the trust fund , before a constructive trust can be impos
ed on him. Must the 
stranger actually have known that he was receiving or de
aling with trust 
property in breach of trust? Or is it sufficient that h
e should have known , 
or could have discovered the breach had he acted in a re
asonable manner? 
3. 
The concept of the trust is concerned with interests in property. Before 
an express trust can exist there must be property over which the express trust 
can be imposed. Thus a second problem arises as to whether the existence of 
such property, in the hands of the constructive trustee, is necessary before 
the constructive trust can be imposed. If the answer to this question is in 
the negative, a further question will arise - what is the exact nature of the 
constructive trust? 
These questions, among others, will be discussed in the context of the 
three cases of Blyth, Mara, and Re Bell. 
' 
4. 
III. THE AUTHORITATIVE BASIS OF THE DECISION I N RE BELL 
Mara v. Browne, Blyth v. ~ladgale, and Re Be ll all involved solicitors who, 
without their partners' actual knowledge, dealt with a trust fund in a manner 
which turned out to be a breach of trust. In each case the beneficiaries of 
the express trust brought an action against the solicitors, seeking to make them 
and their partners liable for the loss of the trust fund. In Blyth the wrongdoing 
partner and the other partners, who had no actual knowledge of what had been done, 
were all held liable as constructive trustees. In Re Be ll the wrongdoing partner 
was liable as constructive trustee, but his partner was no t so liable. In Mara 
neither the partner who dealt with the fund, nor the innoce nt partner was he ld 
liable as constructive trustee. How, then, can these cases be reconciled? 
It will be necessary first to describe in detail what happened in each case. 
A. Detailed Examination of the Three Ca ses 
1. Blyth v. Fladgate 1891 
Under a marriage settlement in 1855 between Mr. and Mrs. B, the three 
trustees were to invest the trust fund in real securities and to pay the income 
to Mrs. B during her life. While G, the last surviving trustee, was alive he 
authorised payment of the trust fund to Fladgates, a firm of solicitors. On 
G's instructions Fladgates invested the money in Exchequer bills, depositing 
the bills in Fladgates' name at their bank. G died in June 1883. Subsequently, 
Mr. B wanted to find a suitable investment for the trust fund. He saw S, a 
partner in Fladgates. S, who ac ted for the firm throughout
6
, pointed out that 
there were no trustees of the settlement. Thre e new trustees, including S 
himself, were proposed, but because of a delay the y were not appointed until 
April 1884. Before this the Exchequer bills were sold by order of the firm and 
the proceeds banked at their bankers. Then, in Marc h 1884, S advised and 
executed an investment of the trust fund in favour of the proposed trustees 
(who, with Sand Mr. B, had approved the investment). The advance was imprudent. 
The investment proved to be an insufficient security,and thus it was held that 
a breach of trust was committed. 
s. 
Shortly after this transaction the trustees were appointed. In Blyth v. 
7 
Smith , which was decided in 1888, the trustees were held jointly and 
severally liable to make good the Joss sustained because they had, by never 
repudiating the investment, effectively sanctioned an investment that could 
not be made by duly constituted trustees. Some £9,600 had been lost. In an 
attempt to fully recover that amount, the beneficiaries of the express trust 
brought an action claiming that the partners of S were also liable for the loss 
of the trust fund. It was admitted that: (i) all the partners actually knew 
that, having had custody of the Exchequer bills, the partnership had sold them 
and retained the proceeds in the partnership's bank account; (ii) all the 
partners knew, or were affected with knowledge, that the bills were subject to 
the trusts of the settlement. 
The partners of S were held liable as constructive trustees, even though 
they had no actual knowledge of S's activities with regard to the fund. In 
reaching his decision, Stirling J. does make statements that give the impression 
that liability was imposed on them on the principle that the knowledge of one 
partner must be imputed to the other members of a partnership:
8 
The knowledge so ac~uired by [sJ must, as it seems to me, be imputed to 
the other partners, whose agent he was, for the purpose of dealing with 
this trust fund under their control. I think, therefore, that the other 
partners must be taken to have had notice that the security was not of a 
character suitable for the investment of trust funds, and was one which 
the trustees of the settlement could not properly sanction as an investment 
of the funds in the custody of the firm. The partners were consequently 
implicated in the b~each of trust that was committed. 
However, these comments should be read in the light of the facts of the 
case and the manner in which the problem was introduced by Stirling J.? 
The funds came into the custody and under the control of the firm with 
notice of the trusts upon which they were held; and as against the Plaintiffs 
in Blyth v. Fladgate, it lay with the firm to discharge themselves by 
showing that the funds were duly applied in accordance with the trusts. 
Interpreting the case on this statement, the partnership undertook a duty 
by receiving the trust fund at a time when there were no trustees. To discharge 
themselves, the honest partners needed to show that the funds were applied in 
6. 
accordance with the tenns of the trust. This they could not do because of the 
investments made bys, and all members of the partnership were liable as 
constructive trustees. 
2. Mara v. Browne 1896 
Mrs. M was the life tenant under a marriage settlement made on her marriage 
to HR. It was discovered that J, one of the trustees of the trust fund, had 
misapplied that fund. His co-trustee was W, who had not been active in the 
management of trust affairs. In January 1884 Mr. and Mrs. HR, who had power 
to appoint the trustees, appointed AR in p]ace of W. However, AR and W did 
not execute this deed. J remained trustee on the understanding that, when he 
had made good the deficiencies in the assets, he would be replaced by Miss. MR. 
The deficiencies were made good and by deed of 9 May 1884 she was appointed 
trustee to act with AR. However,between January 1884 and 9 May 1884 J paid the 
trust money into a joint account for himself and AR, from which payments were 
made to HB. HB was a solicitor, who advised investments of the trust fund. 
Once that advice had been considered and approved by AR and Mr. and Mrs. HR, 
HB would make the investment. J knew that investments were being made with 
the money, but was not consulted about the actual investments made. 
Some of the investments were imprudent and made in breach of trust. Mrs. M 
sought to make liable as constructive trustees HB, who had advised and made the 
investments, and AB, his partner in the solicitors' firm, who knew nothing of 
what had happened. It was accepted that any possible liability of HB for 
negligence in advice given was, by the time the action was brought, barred by 
the Statute of Limitations. 
It was not contended that HB was guilty of any fraudulent or dishonest 
d t t th . j f th b f" . . 
10 
con uc o e in ury o e ene iciaries. Having admitted this it became 
necessary to admit that, if the deed appointingAR and Miss MR trustees had been 
executed in January 1884 1 then HB could not be liable as he would have been 
acting merely within his capacity as the solicitor of the trustees. However 
the plaintiff argued that until 9 May AR was at most a trustee de son tort, an 
intermeddler, as he was not validly appointed a trustee. J and W were the 
7. 
existing trustees and neither was authorising HB to ac t for him. As HB had 
no principals, the plaintiff argued, he must be held to be a principal himself 
and therefore liable as a trustee de son tort. 
The defendant argued that when HB made the investment he acted only as 
agent and with the authority of the then existing trustees, J and AR, and so 
was not liable as a constructive trustee.
11 
Since HB was not a constructive 
trustee it followed that AB could not be. An alternative argwnent was that 
even if HB was a constructive trustee, AB, although a partner of HB, was not 
as he knew nothing of what happened. 
12 
North J. held that the deed of January 1884 was never acted upon and was 
abandoned incomplete. He held HB liable as a constructive trustee - he was an 
agent in possession of trust funds who, without the consent of duly appointed 
trustees, misapplied the trust fund. North J. also held that AB was liable 
the receipt of money by a partner in the course of business is a receipt by the 
firm and thus all the partners were liable. Whether AB was liable as a 
constructive trustee or under partnership law was irrelevant, in North J. 's 
opinion, for liability was to the same extent in either case. 
The Appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal took a different view of the 
facts. Lord Herschell, A.L. Smith L.J., and Rigby L.J. all held that AR was a 
validly appointed express trustee under the appointment of January 1884. On 
this view of the facts it was clear that HB received the money from duly 
appointed trustees for application upon specific investments and he so applied 
the money. He acted only in his capacity as solicitor and so could not be 
liable as a constructive trustee. 
An issue on alternative facts was argued strongly before the Court: if AR 
had not been validly appointed as a trustee, but by his actions became a trustee 
de son tort as an intermeddler, would this affect the liability of the solicitor 
HB7 North J. at trial had accepted that this would render HB liable. The 
Court of Appeal, having decided that AR was validly appointed, was not obliged 
to consider this question and two of the judges did not. Lord Herschell, obiter, 
expressed the opinion that even if the trustee, under whose instructions the 
8. 
solicitor worked, was invalidly appointed; the solicitor would not be liable as 
constructiv~ trustee, so long as he acted honestly in the course of his agency. 
If HB was not liable as constructive trustee it was clear that AB, his 
innocent partner, was not liable also. However the three judges in the Court 
of Appeal expressed the opinion that, even if HB was liable as constructive 
trustee, AB, as an innocent partner, would not also be liable because
13 
it is not within the scope of the i mplied authority of a partner in such 
a busine ss that he should so act as to make himself a constructive trustee, 
and thereby subject his partner to the same liability. 
3. Re Bell's Indenture, Hickley v. Bell 1980 
By a marriage settlement, the settler settled property on himself for life 
and, by his will, he devised that property to his son, A, for life with various 
remainders over. In 1940 A and his mother, the settlor's widow, became the 
only trustees of the trusts created by the will and betwe en then and 1947 they 
dissipated the whole trust fund in breach of trust. H, a partner in the firm 
of solicitors acting for the trustees, knew of these misapplications and in 
some cases actively assisted in them. H knew that payments, that he made to A 
and his mother from the trust fund held by the solicitors' firm, were 
misappropriated by them as trustees of the fund. Although moneys received and 
paid in breach of trust passed through the firm's client account in the name 
of the trustees, H's partner had no actual knowledge of the breaches of trust 
and acted reasonably throughout. 
A died in 1959 and the life interest passed to his mother and, on her 
death, to other members of the family. The plaintiffs, who had contingent 
interests under the will trusts, made inquiries and in 1967 discovered what 
had happened. Proceedings were brought against H, the executors of the estate 
of H's partner, and the executrix of A's estate claiming the replacement of 
the various sums and assets dissipated in breach of trust. It was conceded 
that: 
(i) A was liable as a trustee for breaches of trust; 
(ii) H was liable as a constructive trustee in so far as he assisted 
in the breaches of trust. 
9. 
Questions arose as to the actual amount of liability, bul these are of no 
concern here. The issue of concern here was whether H's partner was liable 
either as constructive trustee, or alternatively und er the principle embodied 
in sections 10 and 11 of the Partnership Act 1890 (U.K.). 
The plaintiffs argued that Blyth supported the proposition that, where a 
partner is conducting the business of the partnership, the knowledge of that 
partner with regard to that business must be imputed to the other members of 
the partnership. Thus whenever trust moneys are received by a firm of solicitors 
and are paid out for a purpose which one of the partners knows to be a breach 
of trust, all the partners are liable to make good the breach of trust, under 
either a constructive trust or alternatively sections 10 and 11 of the 
Partnership Act 1890 (U.K.). The defendant, H's partner, argued that H alone 
was the wrongdoer. H's partner had acted honestly throughout, and had done 
everything he could reasonably have bePn expected to do, and therefore should 
not be liable. 
The claim against H's partner was dismissed. Vinelott J. distinguished 
Blyth and applied obiter in Mara, accepting the principle that "a solicitor has 
the implied authority of his partners to receive trust moneys as agent of the 
trustees, but does not have any implied authority to constitute himself a 
constructive trustee.
1114 
B. The Three Cases Discussed and Distinguished 
1. Mara and Blyth 
One significant difference between Blyth and Mara is the respective state 
of knowledge of the partners conducting the transactions involved. In Blyth 
s, knowing that he was dealing with a trust fund, had actual knowledge that 
the investments were in breach of trust. 
15 In Mara however, although there was 
a suggestion that HB might well have been guilty of some negligence,
16 
it was 
conceded that HB had no actual knowledge that his investment of the trust money 
17 
was a breach of trust. It is clear thnt if HB had known he was pnrticipating 
inn breach of trust he would have been liable as a constructive trustee. 
10. 
By conceding that HB did not knowingly assist in a breach of trust, thP plaintiff 
was forced to contend that HB was liable because, acting as a principal, he was 
an intermeddler in the affairs of the trust. This argument failed when HB 
established that he acted under instructions from duly appointed trustees and 
the action against him was dismissed. This difference in the facts is crucial 
in explaining why HB in Mara was not constructive trustee and Sin Blyth was, 
but it does not explain the difference in liability of the innocent partners 
in the two cases. 
As regards the liability of the partners not directly involved in the 
transactions, it could be claimed
18 
that the two cases are inconsistent because 
Blyth states that notice to one partner is to be imputed to the others, while 
the obiter comment of all three members of the Court of Appeal in Mara
19 
states 
that it is not. In Blyth Stirling J. does make statements that appear to support 
the proposition that the knowledge of one partner that makes him a constructive 
trustee is to be imputed to the other partners, who must be taken to have had 
knowledge equivalent to that of the wrongdoing partner, thus rendering the 
innocent partners liable as constructive trustees.
20 
It is submitted, as was 
pointed out by Vinelott J. in Re Bell,
21 
that these statements must be read in 
the light of the special facts of Blyth. In Blyth the partnership, having sold 
the Exchequer bills, took receipt of the trust fund at a time when there were no 
trustees. In doing so, the partnership came under a duty and to discharge 
themselves had to show that the funds were applied in accordance with the terms 
of the trust. It is in this context that the stat~~ent is made that the 
knowledge of one partner is to be imputed to the others. It is submitted that 
the true import of these words is that the knowledge of the trust and actions 
in breach of trust of one partner were such as to breach the duty imposed on 
the partnership and render the whole partnership liable. If this is correct, 
the decision can then be distinguished from Mara. 
The fundamental difference in fact between Blyth and Mara is that the 
solicitors' firm in Blyth received and dealt with the trust fund at a time 
when there were no trustees; whereas in Mara it was found that the solicitor, 
11. 
HB, acted throughout on instruclions from duly appointed trustees . In Blyth 
by selling the Exchequer bills and taking receipt of the trust fund at a time 
when there were no trustee s, the partnership became constructive trustee s of the 
fund. As such the partnership came under a duty to ensure that the trust fund 
22 
was applie d in accordance with the t e rms of the trusts of which they were aware. 
In~ by r eceiving the fund on i n5trucli ons frorr dul y appJintcd trustees, HB 
ac ted merely as solicitor and no constructive trust could be imposed on him at 
this stage. In Blyth Fladgates could not claim that, in receiving and deal ing 
with the fund, they acted as agents of trustees as there were no trustees at the 
time. 
The differing points in time at which constructive trusts can arise are 
perhaps best explained by reference to the two types of constructive trusts 
referred to in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Crad ock (no. 3)
23 and adopted 
by Goff J. in Competitive Insurance Co. v. Davies Investments.
24 
The two types 
of constructive trust are: (i) where the defendant has already become a 
constructive trustee before the acts or omissions complained of; and (ii) where 
the very act or omission which gives rise to liability is that which creates 
the constructive trusteeship. Blyth falls in the first category. By selling the 
Exchequer Bills and receiving the proceeds at a time when there were no trustees, 
the partnership intermeddled in the trust affairs. At that time they became 
constructive trustees subject to certain obligations. 
25 
The act that brought 
about the partnership's liability only occurred after the creation of the 
constructive trust. However Mara and, as will be seen, Re Bell are in the s econd 
category of case where the very act or omission which gives rise to liability is 
that which causes the constructive trusteeship. In Mara no constructive trust 
could arise on receipt of the fund because at this stage HB was acting as the 
agent of trustees. If HB had then decided to misapply the fund in breach of 
trust,he would be rendered liable by a constructive trust arising instantaneously 
with the act giving rise to liability. 
Ignoring for the moment any difference in the level at which the l~plied 
authority test is ~~lied in the two cases;
26 the difference between the 
12. 
liability of s•s partners in Blyth and AB in Mara revolves around the difference 
between the two categories of constructive trust outlined by Goff J. in 
Competitive Insurance. In Blyth as all the partners were constructive trustees 
on receipt of the trust fund, when one partner, acting as agent of the 
partnership in administering the trust fund, made investments in breach of trust 
all the partners automatically became jointly and severally liable for that 
breach of trust. The basis of liability is analogous to the situation where 
an express trustee,by acting in breach of trust,renders his co-trustees jointly 
and severally liable. Here liability is imposed because the passive trustee is 
himself said to be in some way guilty of an act or a default prejudicial to the 
trust. An example of such liability would be the case where one trustee, T1
, 
leaves a matter in the hands of his co-trustee, T2
, without inquiry. T1 i
s 
jointly and severally liable with T2 
for any breach of trust brought about by 
T
2
•
27 
In Blyth, after the creation of the constructive trust, one of the 
constructive trustees made an investment in breach of trust, while acting as the 
agent of the other constructive trustees and without inquiry from them about his 
activities. On this interpretation, it is submitted that the decision in Blyth 
is correct. 
In Mara as HB was held not liable as constructive trustee it was clear that 
AB was not liable. But asswne for the moment that in Mara HB had been held 
liable as constructive trustee on the grounds, for instance,of interrneddling 
in the application of the trust funds without the authority of the trustees.
28 
However, even on this asswnption, no constructive trust could be imposed on the 
whole firm prior to the act that brought about the liability of HB. A 
constructive trust could be imposed on HB as a result of his receipt of the 
trust fund from AR (an intermeddler) or as a result of his invesbnent of the 
trust fund in breach of trust. In either case the constructive trust imposed 
on HB would only arise as a result of the action that brought about the claim 
against him. If the court found that, by his dealings with the trust fund, 
HB was liable as a constructive trustee, the ½uestion as to the liability of 
AB could not be settled automatically on the basis of AB's existing status as 
13. 
a construc tive trustee , as it c o u l d b e in Bl y t h. Th ~u e stion of the li abil ity of 
AB wruld have to b e l ook e d a t separ ale ly in t h P l i g h l of t h e p ositior1 o f t h a t 
partne r hims e l f . 
2. Re Bell and t h e J i g - saw 
In Re Be ll, as in Blyth, the t rust fund wa s r e c e ived into the clie nt's 
account of the firm, whe rea s in Mara the mo n e y was r e c e ived into the private 
account of one of the partners. In Mara it was n o t argue d that rec eipt of the 
fund into the private account of HB me ant that HB was acting in his private 
capacity and so could not possibly r e nd e r AB liable. It s e e ms to have b een 
a ssumed that HB was in fact acting in his capac i ty as a s o licitor of the firm. 
For this reason it is suggested that Vine lott J. wa s correct whe n he state d that 
t his difference in the facts betwe en Re Be ll and Mara was irre levant for the 
purpose of distinguishing the two cases on their facts.
29 
In Re Bell H actually knew of and in some cases active ly assisted in the 
dishonest design of the trustees and clearly was liable as a constructive trustee. 
This was similar to Blyth where the wrongdoing solicitor actually knew that he 
was applying trust funds in an investment improper for those funds. The different 
result as to the liability of the active partner was r e ached in Mara simply because 
there HB had no actual knowledge that the investme nts he was making were in breach 
of trust. 
In Re Bell, as in~' the trus t fund wa s r e c e ived on instruction s frQ~ 
truste es. Re Be ll was treate d as a case, not of knowing r eceipt a nd d ecling with 
prope rty in breach of trust, but of knowing a ssis tance by Hin a disho n e st d e sign 
o n the part of the trus tee s. In Re Bell t h e r e is t hus no quest i on of t h e e n t ire 
firm b e coming con struc tive trus tee s fr om the ou t s e t a s the r e sult o f a p os i t ive 
assumption of trustee ship as in Blyth. 
If, as i~ assume d for the moment, any liability of the innocent p artners is 
parasitic on the liability of the wrongd o ing p a r t ne r the n the innocent p artne rs 
could be liable either ( i ) )S construc tive trus tee s them s e lve s, or (ii) as partne rs 
o f the p e rson liable as constructive trus tee u nder the Partne rship Ac t 1890 (U.K.). 
30 
The question then becQ~es - to what extent, if any, should the partne rship be 
liable for the acts of a wrongdoing partner? 
14. 
The g e ne ra l a rgume nt f o r h o lding innocent par ln, rs l ic1bl c n " cc,n~tructiv~ 
trustees is l h ~t , whe n t h e wrongd o ing p a rtne r r e c P ive s the t rust fund, he 
r ece ives it as ag e nt of the p a rtne rship and holds hims e lf ou t as repre s e nting 
the partnership in that matte r, so tha t the r e is ac t ually a r e c e ipt by the 
t h ' Th . f th f d k . 1 
31 i d i i t d par ne rs ip. us i e un s we re nowing y rece ve or m sappropr a e 
by the wrongdoing partne r in bre ach of trust, the partne rship would be l iabl e 
as a constructive trustee if it could be said that there was a rece ipt or 
misappropriation by the partne rship . To satisfy this last ste p it must be 
possible to say that , in rece iving or dealing with the trust fund in a wrongful 
manner, the partner was acting within the ordinary c ourse of busine ss of the 
partnership and within the scope of his appare nt authority. 
Holding the innocent partner liable under sections 10 and 11 of the 
Partnership Act 1890 (U.K.)
32 
involves very similar conside rations of what is 
in the scope of the partner's authority and what is in the ordinary course of 
business of the partnership . Indeed North J. in Mara thought that the test of 
liability was the same under both. Having decided that eve rything HB did was 
on behalf of the business and within the scope of his authority, he said: 
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With respect to AB it is hardly worthwhile to co~sider whe ther he is 
a c onstructive truste e or n o t; for a ssuming him not to be a trustee, eve n 
to the extent of the money actually received by the firm, still he is by 
the law of p artnership liable e xactly to the same extent that the p a rtne r 
HB is, and the y must stand or fall together. 
The Court of Appe al in Mara and Vine l ott J. in Re Bel l r e j ec t e d the cl a im 
ag a inst the p a ssive partne rs in those two c a s e s on the following princ iple as 
s tated by Vine lott J. in Re Be ll: "A sol i c i tor h a s t h e implie d a uthority of 
his p artne rs to receive trust mone ys as ag e nt of t h e truste es, bu t doe s not 
have a ny implied authority to c onsti t u t e hims el f a c onstruc tive t rustee ... 
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This presumably wa s thought in b o th cases to be enough to dismiss any possible 
liability of the passive partners, either as constructive trustees or under 
partnership law . Blyth stands consiste ntly with this test, for in Blyth S did 
not make his partners liable because he acted so as to make himself a constructive 
trustee . The whole firm were constructive trustees and then acting in the 
15. 
scope of his authority S breached that trust. 
But, coming to the more important point, if the test in Re Bell is corr
ect 
then it is difficult to see how a partnership could ever be liable for t
he 
partner who has, in the words of Vinelott J. "constitute [ct] himself a constructive 
trustee". There would never be implied authority for a partner to make 
himself 
a constructive trustee, as constructive trusteeship is not contemplated 
by 
either the firm or the wrongdoing partner. The constructive trust arise
s 
regardless of the intention of anybody - it is imposed by the court as t
he 
result of certain conduct or knowledge on the part of people. In this k
ind of 
situation the solicitor will always accept the money as agent of the tru
stees 
and it is only later that the court imposes a constructive trust on him.
 
To state simply that a partner never has the implied authority of the 
partnership to constitute himself a constructive trustee is to preclude 
an 
examination of the facts of the case. Surely it is more logical to seek
 to 
discover exactly what the partner did, to decide whether this was within
 the 
scope of his implied authority, and then to impose liability if those ac
ts were 
within that scope. Stirling J. in Blyth and North J. in Mara both concentra
te 
on the actions of the wrongdoing partner. In Mara North J. took into ac
count 
that in the ordinary course of business this partner had power to receiv
e and 
invest funds in such a manner, that the trust funds went through the par
tnership's 
client account,and that the partnership received payment for the service
s of the 
partner in the transaction. In Blyth s,as a member of the partnership1 w
as asked 
to advise whether a security was a safe one for trustees and then to mak
e the 
investment - a matter which according to Stirling J. fell "within the sc
ope of 
a solicitor's ordinary duties",
35 and also a matter for which the partnership 
received payment. The principle adopted in Re Bell and Mara defies the 
purpose 
of constructive trusts from the outset by precluding an examination of t
he 
facts of the case. Furthermore, such an approach is not accepted in the
 general 
law of principal and agent. It is not sufficient to say that, in an are
a where 
an agent has authority to act for his principal, he does not have autho
rity 
to act negligently, wrongfully or fraudulently. GenuraJly in the law of
 principal 
16. 
and a g Pn t t h e p osition is t h ot : " a n act o f 2- n a g n t w t h in t h e SC()p r o f his 
actu nl or app aren t authority d o~ s n o t c ease t o bind his princip al mer ely 
becau se lhe dg L·nt wa s acting fr a ud ult::n t ly and i n fur t h e r a nce of his own 
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i nter e sts." Wheth e r li nbility is impo s e d o n the princ ipal d e p ends on 
wheth e r, as a ma t ter of fact, it c an b e s a id that the ag e nt was a c ting within 
the s cop e of his implied authority. It is submitte d that, in c onside ring 
whe ther to impose liability as constructive trustees on the partnership as 
a r e sult of the acts of a wrongdoing partne r, the Court should decide the 
~uestion on a similar examination of the facts of the individual case . 
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Examining the facts of Re Bell on this basis it is diffic ult to see , 
given the admitted liability of H as co ·,struc tive trustee , why H's partner 
was not also liable. The trust fund was held in the firm's client account. 
H, who wa s the represe ntative of the firm f o r de a ling with this particular 
c lient, paid out the trust fund to the truste es at the ir re qu e st. This type 
of activity s eem s to be clearly within the s c ope of his authority from the 
partnership. The fact that, whil e acting within the scope of his authority 
as a partner and holding himself out to be a p a rtner, a p e rson acts 
fraudulently and knowingly assists in a breach of trust, does not, it is 
submitted, take that person outside the sphere for which the firm is responsible, 
and thus does not absolve the partnership from liability. 
3 . Liability unde r the Partne rship Act 1890 (U.K.) in Re Bell 
In partne rship law any b a sis for imposing liability on the innoc e nt 
partners of a firm, as the r e sult of the wrongdo ing partne r's acts, is to be 
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f ound in s e ctions 10 and 11 of the Pa r t n e rship Ac t 1890 (U.K.). Sec tion 
39 
10 refe rs to general torts, while s e ction 11 r e fers to spe cific torts in the 
nature of fraudulent misappropriations. As Blyth, Mara, and Re Bell all deal 
with fraudulent misappropriations o f prope rty, the specific nature of section 
11 is more apposite here. Section 11 reads: 
In the following cases; namely - (a) whe re one partner acting within 
the scope of his apparent authority receives the money or property of 
a third person and misapplies it; and (b) where a firm in the course of 
its business receives money or property of a third person, and the money 
17. 
or prope rty so receive d is misapplied by one or more of thP partners while 
it is in the custody of the firm; the firn1 is liable to make good lhe loss. 
It is difficult to understand why this section has b een given such little 
weight in argwnent and in the judgme nts in the three cases. No reference was 
made to the sections either in argument or in the judgments in both Blyth and 
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Mara. In Re Bell it was argue d tha 1 liability of the innocent partners 
arose either under the Partnership Act or under a constructive trust. Vinelott 
J. conducted no analysis of the sections but presumably, by stating that a 
partner has no implied authority of the firm to make himself a constructive 
trustee, believed he had dispose d of the argument b a sed on partnership law 
a s we ll. 
By section 11(a) whe re one partne r acting wi thin the scope of his apparent 
authority obtains money and misapplies it, the firm appears to be prima facie 
liable . The question that arises is whether the acce ptance of the property 
by the individual partner was within the scope of his apparent authority so 
t b t b the fl.. rm • 4 1 as o e an accep ance y Section 11(a) deals with the situation 
where there is some doubt as to whether there was ever a r ceipt of the fund 
by the firm. In Re Bell, although the exact knowledge of H's partner as to 
the receipt of the fund is not made clear, the case s eem s to assume that the 
trust fund was received by the firm and that the only complaint occurred 
subsequently, as a result of the misapplication by H. For this reason Re Bell 
se ems to fall under sectio n 11(b), which de als w~t h a misapplication by one 
th f
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partner after a receipt by e 1.rm. It requires that a firm "in the course 
of its business" have received money or property of a third person. This was 
clearly the case in Re Bell where the firm received a trust fund from trustees 
in the course of its business. For liability of the whole firm the section 
then only requires that one of the partners misapply the money while it is in 
the custody of the firm. Re Bell seems to fall squarely within section 11(b) 
of the Partnership Act
43 
and it is submitted that Hts partner should have been 
rendered liable.
44 
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It has been suggested that the reason why the passive partner is not 
liable as a result of the acts of the wrongdoing partner might well be the 
18. 
opera t i on of s ectio n 13 of the Pa rtnership Act 1890 .
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Sect i on 1 3 is a s 
follows; 
If a partne r b e ing a trustee imprope rly e mploys trust prop e rty in lhe 
bu s iness or on the account of the partne rship no o t h e r partne r is liable 
for the trust prope rty to the p e rson b e ne ficially inte r e ste d the r e in, 
provided (1) this section shall not affect any liability incurred by any 
partner by r ea s o n o f hi s h aving noli ce o f a breach o f trust. •• 
An initial q ue stion arise s as to whether "trustee" in the s ection include s 
constructive trustee. Accepting that a constructive trustee falls within 
" trustee" in section 13, it should be noted that the s e ction doe s not affec t 
"any liability incurred by any partne r by r e ason of his having notice of a 
breach of trust". There is a strong argume n t that, e v e n if s e ction 13 is 
other wise applicable, it would be of no effect anyway as it begs the que stion 
a s to whe ther the innocent partne rs can be taken to have "no tice" of the 
di t ' t· ·t· 47 wrong o ng par ner sac ivi ies. 
It is further submitted that s e ction 13 is of no application in Re Bell 
because in that case the wrongdoing partner at no stage empl oyed the trust 
property "in the business or on the account of the partne rship". Section 13 
exists to deal with the situation where a partner, who is an express trustee , 
without the knowledge of his co-partners, brings the trust fund into the 
business and uses them for busine ss purpose s. The constructive trust on H 
arose as a r e sult of his dealings with the trust fund after receipt by the 
firm. From the time the construc tive trust first arose and subseque ntly, 
rather than employing the trust prope rty in the busine ss, H paid the fund 
out of the busine ss. For these r e asons sec tion 13 is of no appliea tion in 
the Re Be ll situation. The r e fore it is submitte d that H's p artne r should 
have b e en held liable under s ection 11(b) of the Partne rship Act 1890 (U.K.). 
C. Conclusion 
It is submitte d, in the light of the foregoing analysis, that Re Bell 
w~s wrongly decided. The analysis es t ablishes that H's partner should have 
19. 
be e n l iablt-· for the l o sse s e ilhe r a s a constructiv lrus tPe or und vr s ec tion 
11(b) of lhe Pdrtne rship Act 1890. Il must b e str sse d that lhe propo s e d 
l i ability of H' s p ar t ne r a s a c o n s true t iv,_. lrus t ee is no t b ased o n a ny actual 
or constructive knowl e dge of a bre ac h o f trust. As is argue d in Part IV, 
l iability as a construc tive trus tee in the ''knowing r eceipt or dealing" and 
"k nowing assis t ance" categories should only b e based on actual knowledge of 
a bre ach of trust. H's partne r did not have actual knowledge and the refore 
c ould not be liable in this manner. The propose d liability of H's partner 
has a differe nt base. H was liable as a constructive trustee because he 
knowingly assisted in a breach of trust. Be cause H was at the time acting 
within the scope of his implied authority, his liability had the conseque nce 
of rendering the entire partne rship liable as constructive trustee s. 
As a matter of policy a principle of insuranc e might be use d t o justify 
the result that has been argued for conceptually. The wrongdoing agent will 
ordinarily be a member of a company or a partnership. This idea of insurance 
is that the company or partnership, being a collection of people, is better 
able to provide for the loss than the victim. They may be able to provide 
for such loss either by insurance or by inclusion of an amount whe n calculating 
charges to be made for services. The l o ss should b e borne by those best able 
to bear it. 
20. 
IV. THE DECISION IN RE BELL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 
IMPOSED ON STRANGERS 
A. Classification of Constructive Trusts Imposed on Strangers 
The textbooks
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categorize constructive trusts imposed on strangers into 
three classes: positive assumption of trusteeship; strangers knowingly 
receiving or dealing with trust property; strangers knowingly assisting in 
a dishonest design. 
1. Positive assumption of trusteeship: 
The manner in which liability as a constructive trustee arises in this 
category was defined by A.L. Smith L.J. in Mara v. Browne:
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If one, not being a trustee and not having authority from a trustee, takes 
upon himself to intermeddle with trust matters or to do acts characteristic 
of the office of trustee, he may thereby make himself what is called a 
trustee of his own wrong - i.e. a trustee de son tort, or, as it is 
termed a constructive trustee. 
As by definition the constructive trust is imposed as a result of a positive 
assumption of trusteeship there must be actual knowledge of the existence of 
the trust and conscious performance of acts in the course of management of 
the trust fund. As well, the constructive trust is imposed from the initial 
assumption of trusteeship while the act bringing about the claim for liability 
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may well occur much later. In Blyth, by assuming control of the trust fund 
with knowledge that there were no existing trustees, the partne rship bec ame 
subject to a constructive trust of this type. 
2 . Strangers knowingly receiving or dealing with trust property 
A person is a constructive trustee in the following situations under this 
category - (a) if, though not nominated as a trustee, he has received trust 
' 1 t' , , t d t' 
51 th 't. t t property with actua , construe ive or i.mpu e no ice at 1 is rus 
property transferred in breach of trust; or (b) if (not being a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice and not protected by the provisions of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 (U.K.)
52
) he acquires notice subsequent to such receipt, 
and then deals with the property in a manner inconsistent with the trust.
53 
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3. Knowing assistance in a dishonest design 
Where a person assists with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design 
on the part of the trustees, that person may be treated as a constructive 
trustee primarily for the purpose of being subjected to a purely personal 
liability to account. 
There has been much disagreement as to the measure of knowledge required 
in this category before the constructive trust can be imposed on the defendant. 
In Selangor United Rubber Estates 
54 
v. Cradock (no.3) the District Bank acting 
as agent had, without being aware of the fact, enabled the first defendant 
unlawfully to buy the plaintiff company with its own money . Ungoed - Thomas J. 
in the High Court held the bank liable as a constructive trustee because its 
employees should have known, even though they did not in fact know, that they 
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were assisting in a fraudulent and dishonest design on the part of trustees. 
In Karak Rubber Co. v. Burden (no.2)
56
, on almost identical facts as the 
Selangor case, Brightman J. applied that same test of constructive knowledge 
in imposing a constructive trust on Barclays Bank. The Bank's employees had 
no actual knowledge that they were assisting in a fraudulent and dishonest 
design. However dicta of the Court of Appeal in Carl - Zeiss Stiftung v. 
Herbert Smith (no.2)
57
, a decision of Goff J. in Competitive Insurance Co. v. 
Davies Investments
58 
and dicta of Goff L.J. and Buckley L.J. in Belmont Finance 
Corp. v. Williams Furniture Ltd.
59 
have indicated that constructive knowledge 
will not suffice for the imposition of a constructive trust in this category. 
On this view the defendant must be shown to have assisted with actual or 
"Nelsonian" knowledge - i.e. actually to have known of the dishonesty or to 
have wilfully shut his eyes to the dishonesty. Because of this conflict of 
authority, the law on this point remains uncertain. 
B. The Classification Discussed in relation to Re Bell 
1. The position of agents of trustees 
An agent of trustees would appear to be in the same position as the 
stranger in the tests laid down in the three categories outlined above. In 
22. 
dealing with the agent of truslePs thP warnings of Lord Selborne in Barnes v. 
Addy
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and Bennet J. in Wil]iams - Ashman v. Pric~ and Willinms
61 
should be 
borne in mind • Lord Selborne stated that: 
6? 
••• Strangers are not to be made constructive trustees ~erely because 
they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal 
powers, transactions perhaps, of which a Court of Equity may disapprove, 
unless those agents receive and become charge able with some part of the 
trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishone st and 
fraudulent design on the part of the trustees ••• If those principles were 
disregarded, I know not how any one could, in transactions admitting of 
doubt as to the view which a Court of Equity might take of them, safely 
discharge the office of solicitor, of banker, or of agent of any sort to 
trustees. But, on the other hand, if persons dealing honestly as agents 
are at liberty to rely on the legal power of the trustees, and are not to 
have the character of trustees constructively imposed upon them, then the 
transactions of mankind can safely be carried through ••• 
Furthermore as regards agents in receipt of trust property Bennet J. in 
Williams - Ashman said:
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An agent in possession of money which he knows to be trust money, so long 
as he acts honestly, is not accountable to the beneficiaries interested 
in the trust money unless he intermeddles in the trust by doing acts 
characteristic of a trustee and outside the duties of an agent. 
On this authority an agent dealing with trust property who acts honestly 
in the course of his agency cannot be made subject to a constructive trust.
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The policy reason for this, according to Lord Selborne, is so that trust 
business may safely be conducted by professional men. Selangor and Karak 
Rubber Co. do not stand consistently with this authority, and indeed undermine 
the policy concept behind the exclusion of honest agents from the burdens of 
constructive trusteeship. 
2. Re Bell - which category?; does it matter, 
Having described the categories under which strangers have been liable as 
constructive trustees, it is necessary to consider under which category H was 
held liable in Re Bell. Vinelott J. stated: 
"It is admitted that in as much as he assisted with knowledge in the 
23. 
misappropriation of trust montys held in the trustees' client account with 
the firm, [ H ] is liable as construc tive trustee. 
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The case s eems to proceed on the assumption that the r eceipt of the trust 
fund by the firm was not in breach of trust. H then knowingly assisted in a 
dishonest design on the part of the truslees and so was liable as a constructive 
trustee. However, on the facts of the case this does not appear to be strictly 
correct. The amount of £38,260 which was received by the partnership between 
August 1940 and February 194 7, included sums "from the sale or realization of 
trust investments including a farm known as Churchill farm and of an item o f 
jewellery 11 •
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This sale of Churchill farm was found to be in breach of trust. 
The farm had been sold by the trustees of the marriage settlement to the 
trustees of the voluntary settlement. The sale was shown, by a letter given 
in evidence, to be to raise money for d i stribution to A and his mother. The 
Court acce p ted that as the s ale was to facilitate a breach of trust, the sale 
itself was a breach of trust. Thus at least this part of the fund received by 
. . b h f 67 the firm was received in reac o trust. It may well be that liability of 
Has constructive trustee, at least as to this part of the fund, should have 
been founded on the "knowing_ receipt or dealing category". 
This distinction would not effect the liability of H's partner where that 
liability is argued to be parasitic on the liability of H, but it would be 
significant if it is argued that liability of the honest partner is indepe nde nt 
o f the liability of the wrongdoing partner. If liability of the honest partner 
is to be founded on some act or omission of the hone s t partner himself, the 
que stion then b ecome s what must be done by him to found liability? 
In Re Bell Vinelott J. emphasised that H's partner had acted not only 
honestly, but also as a reasonable solicitor in his position ought to have 
acted. The latter finding suggests that Vine lott J. might we ll have bee n 
prepared to hold H's partner liable as a constructive trustee if he had 
constructive knowledge of the dishonest a nd fraudulent d e sign. However, if 
the facts of a case place it into the category of knowing assistance in a 
dishonest and fraudulent design~
8 then it would appear that actual knowledge 
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d d bf th b 1 . b'l' 69 is nee e e ore ere can e ia i ity. If this is so, liability as 
constructive trustees of the honest partners of the firm could not occur 
independently of the liability of the wrongdoing partner. 
However, if the facts place the case in the category of "knowing receipt 
or dealing" it would appear that constructive knowledge is sufficient to make 
one a c onstructive trustee . If that is so, then liability of the honest 
partne rs of the firm as constructive trustees could occur without arising 
automatically from the wrongdoing p artner's liability; but rathe r by s omE:. act 
or omission of the hone st partne r himse lf . Knowledge in this category would 
include actual and constructive knowl e dge. Thus, although the honest partner 
clearly has no actual knowledge of the r eceipt in breach of trust, he may have 
constructive knowledge because there was something that he should have done, 
but did not, that would have given him actual knowledge of the receipt in breach 
of trust . 
In Re Bell it was accepted that H's partner acted throughout honestly and 
reasonably . Thus, in that case, no difference in liability could have arisen 
because of a difference in the standard of knowledge required in the ''knowing 
receipt or dealing" and "knowing assistance" categories. However the point still 
remains that, where the honest partner is negligent in not making inquiries and 
so is held to have constructive notice, he will be liable independently of the 
liability of the wrongdoing partner, so long as the activities that have 
occurred fall into the "knowing receipt or dealing" category and not the ''knowing 
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assistance" category . 
3 . The "knowing rece ipt or dealing" and "knowing assistance" cate gories 
should there be a difference in the test of knowl edge? 
The factual difference between the two categories needs some explanation . 
In the "knowing receipt or dealing" category it is cle ar that the stranger must 
have received the property. It would appear possible to assist in a dishonest 
and fraudulent design without ever actually receiving the trust property 
involved. However, in every case which can be categorised as in the ''knowing 
assistance" category , the stranger or agent has actually received the trust fund 
25. 
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at some stage. So thi s cannot be a r e levant dis tinction for th e:- purposl , f 
explaining the diffe r ence in the measure of knowledge required between the 
two categories. 
Anothe r possible distinction is that in the ''knowing receipt or deal ing" 
category it is necessary still to posse ss the trust fund (either actually or 
in a traceable form) be fore liability as a constructive trustee can be imposed; 
whereas in the "knowing assistance" category the stranger will have disposed 
of the trust property if he ever had it. This would accord with the view that 
the "knowing receipt or deal ing" category is a traditional type of constructive 
trust in the form of a proprietary institution; whereas in the "knowing 
assistance" category the defendant is t e rmed a constructive trustee purely as 
a prerequisite for subjecting him to a personal liability to account.
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However the "knowing receipt or dealing" category includes the person who, 
not being a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, acquires notice of 
t he breach of trust subsequently to receipt and then deals with the property 
in a manner inconsistent with the trust. This seems to contemplate imposition 
of a constructive trust in this category on a person who no longer has the trust 
fund. 
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Furthermore Lee v. Sankey is a case often stated as falling into the 
category of ''knowing receipt or dealing", yet in that case the person upon whom 
the constructive trust was imposed no longer had the trust fund. Solicitors 
were employed by two trustees to receive proceeds of sale. Without authority 
they paid over the proceeds to only one of the trustees, when it should have 
been paid to both. This trustee misappropriated the money and the solicitors 
were held liable to the be ne fi c iaries. 
Having argued that it is not acceptable to distinguish the two categories 
by the pre sence or abse nce of property, an example is given here of difficulties 
in categorization, as a result of application of this test. An agent rece ives 
trust property in breach of trust. He has constructive, but not actual, notice 
of the breach of trust. He then assists in a disposal of the trust property 
to the trustee in breach of trust in circumstances in which he did not actually 
know that he was assisting in a breach of trust but should have known. Is it 
26. 
to be said lhat as the agent fortuitously disposed of the prop rty he is
 not in 
the "knowing receipt or dealing" category; and that because he had no ac
tual 
knowledge he could not be liable in the "knowing assistance" category? 
Another possible distinction is that the "knowing receipt or dealing" 
category requires that the trust property initially be received by the s
tranger 
in breach of trust; whereas the "knowing assistance" category covers the
 
situation where the stranger, while not having receive d the property in 
breach 
of trust, subsequently d~al s with it by knowingly assisting i n a dishon
est and 
fraudulent design. If this is the only diffe rence between the two categ
ories 
then it is difficult to see why a pe rson, who receives property in breac
h of 
trust and then disposes of it by assisting in a dishonest design is sub
ject to 
liability on a different basis of knowledge from the person who having 
received 
the property in accordance with the trust then disposes of that property
 by 
assisting in a dishonest and fraudulent design. As in both instances th
e claim 
is for property that has been wrongfully disposed of, the manner of r ec
eipt of 
that property should obviously be irrelevant to the basis of liability a
s 
constructive trustee. The relevant factor is the knowledge that the de
fendant 
had of the breach of trust committed in disposing of the property - and 
the 
test should be the same in either case. 
To find a satisfactory basis for distinguishing the "knowing receipt or
 
dealing" and "knowing assistance" categories proves to be very difficul
t. 
If the test of knowl edge required f or liability is the same in both cate
gories , 
then such difficulties as to rigid classification become less important 
and 
such technicalitie s do not determine the basis on which liability is imp
osed . 
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Dicta of Brightman J. in Karak Rubbe r support the contention that constr
uctive 
notice is sufficient to impose a constructive trust in the "knowing rece
ipt or 
dealing" category. Similarly the case of Belmont Finance Ltd v. William
s 
Furniture (no.2) 
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proceeded on the basis that in the "knowing receipt" 
category it was necessary to prove that the defendants received the tru
st moneys 
knowing, or in circumstances in which they ought to have known, that it
 was in 
breach of trust. However it is submitted, in line with comments made by
 
27. 
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A.J. Oakley, th a l a slrangf:r wh <J rec,-.ivt·S prop1,rty i11 bn c.1ch of an expn ss 
trust with constructive, but not ac tual, know]edge of lh<> breach of lhat trust 
should not have the burden of constructive trusteeship imposed on him. To 
impose a constructive trust actual knowledg E should be required whethe r the 
claim is made for (i) knowing receipt of property in breach of trust; or 
(ii) dealing with property in a manner inconsistent with trusts of which 
knowledge is gained subsequently to the r ~ceipt of the property (not be ing a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice); or (iii) knowing assistance in 
a fraudulent and dishonest design on the part of the trustees. Such an approach 
i . h . . 77 would be cons stent wit a number of authorities preceding the Selangor case. 
It would also maintain the policy goal of Lord Selborne in Barnes v. Addy. By 
limiting the liability of strangers as constructive trustees to those people 
who have actual knowledge of a breach of trust, transferees and agents, who 
deal with trust property honestly, need have no fear, and ''the transactions of 
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mankind can safely be carried through". 
If this proposition is accepted then, r egardless of the so-called 
categories that have been considered, the position is as follows: 
(i) When trust property is transferred in breach of trust to a person with 
actual knowledge of the breach of trust, then that person will be bound by the 
equitable interest of the beneficiaries and, as he has actual knowledge, he will 
hold the property as constructive trustee . If he disposes of that property then 
he will be personally liable to account,in the same manner as any e xpre ss trustee 
who dissipates the trust fund in breach of trust. Howe ver, if the be ne ficiaries 
have no chance of satisfaction against the constructive trustee pe rsonally, then 
an equitable tracing claim might still lie against a third party possessing the 
property . 
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(ii) An innocent volunteer who receives trust property in breach of trust is 
not a constructive trustee of the property, but while he holds the property 
those beneficially interested under the express trust can recover the property 
by an equitable tracing claim. If the innocent volunteer disposes of the trust 
property in its original form , the proceeds of disposal can be traced in equity, 
28. 
even into a mixed fund. Howe ver, if the trust prope rty and its proceeds have 
been disposed of so that no equitable tracing claim can be mai• tained, the 
innocent volunteer, as he is not a constructive trustee, is under no pe rsonal 
liability lo account.
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(iii) In a similar manner to (ii), where a person r ece ives trust property in 
breach of trust with conslructive, but not actual, knowl e dge of lhat brPach, he 
will be bound by the equitable inte r e st in the property of the beneficiaries of 
the express trust. This is under the general principle that only a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice takes free of any prior equitable interest. 
The transferee while he has the prope rty or the proceeds will be liable to an 
equitable tracing claim. However if he has disposed of the property, so that 
it is no longer in a traceable fonn, the equitable tracing claim will fail, 
and, as it is submitted that he was never a constructive trustee, he does not 
come under any liability to account.
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C. Conclusion 
In view of the prior analysis, it is submitted that actual knowledge of a 
breach of trust is necessary before a transferee of trust property or an agent 
receiving or dealing with trust property can be made subject to a constructive 
trust. In Re Bell H had actual knowledge that he was assisting in a fraudulent 
and dishonest design, and so was properly subjected to a constructive trust. 
The trust fund and its proceeds having been disposed of, H was personally liable 
to account to the beneficiaries for the loss.
82 H's partners could not be 
liable as construe tive trustee s unde r either the "knowing receipt or dealing" 
or "knowing assistance" categories, as they had no actual knowledge of the 
breach of trust. However, in Part III of this paper it was argued that H's 
partners were liable for the actions of Heither as constructive trustees or 
under the Partnership Act 1890 (U.K.), because H was acting within the scope 
of his implied authority from the partnership. This liability is not dependent 
on any type of knowledge of the partners, and so stands consistently with the 
proposition that actual knowledge of a breach of trust is required before a 
29 . 
c~nstructive trust can be imposed under the "knowing n ~ce ipt or d,..al ing" and 
"knowing assistnnce" categories . 
30. 
V. RE BELL AND GENERAL TRENDS IN THE AREA OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 
The question as to the imposition of a constructive lrust SPem s to arise 
in two situations: (i) where the plaintiff claims that property currently held 
by the defendant should in equity by beneficially held for himse lf; (ii) where 
a claim is made by the plaint ,ff as in (i), except that the property has been 
misappropriated and is no longer held by the defendant.
8 3 In the first situation 
the decision as to whether or not to impose a constructive trust involves the 
consequence that the claDnant parties receive beneficial ownership of the 
property involved. The relative proprietary rights of the two parties are 
concerned. In the second situation the property is not at issue as the de f endant 
does not have it. Rather the plnintiff contends that the defendant is liable 
to account for the loss of the fund. The constructive trust is regarded as a 
prerequisite for the ultimate liability to account. The constructive trust may 
well be concerned with proprietary rights, but in this situation, in deciding 
whether or not to impose a constructive trust, it is likely that the dominant 
consideration will be where the loss should fall. 
Where the problem is to decide whether a person who has been deprived of 
property, or a person proximately or remotely involved in that deprivation, 
should bear the loss, two elements should be considered - the need to compe nsate 
the person who has suffered loss and the need to justify the liability of the 
defendant. The need to compensate the person who has suffered loss can ne ver 
be the only justification for the liability of the defendant. In order to 
require the defendant to compensate the victim, there must be some element in 
the circumstances that, in justice, requires that result. The need to compensate 
the victim and the need to justify the liability of the defenddnt are at ei ther 
end of the scales. As priority is given to one or other of the weights, the 
balance shifts over time. 
It is very difficult to assess a general trend in the area of constructive 
trusts . In some types of trust the emphasis seems to be on definition of the 
circumstances in which it is just to impose liability on the defendant, whilst 
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in others dominnnce is given to the need to compensate the p e rson who has 
suffered l oss. It has bee n suggested that in Re Bel l H's partne r should have 
been held liable to account to the beneficiaries of the Pxpress trust, on the 
basis that H was subjected to a constructive trust, while he was acting within 
the scope of his implied authority from the partne rship, and thus rendered his 
other partners similarly liable. It is proposed to examine the trends in the 
various categories of constructive trust and to asse ss how consistent the 
suggested result in Re Bell is with those tre nds. 
A. Constructive Trusts imposed as a result of a breach of a Fiduciary Duty 
Four main fiduciary relationships exist at English law: trustee and 
beneficiary, agent and principal, director and company, and partne r and co-
partner . There is a marked variety in the treatment of fiduciaries both 
between fiduciary relationships, and within individual relationships depending 
on the nature of any b e nefit obtained by the fiduciary. Two conflicting 
attitudes exist. Generally the a t titude of the law towards fiduciaries is 
harsh . Frequently fiduciaries are pen a lised without any regard whatsoe ver 
as to whether there was any serious conflict of in terest between their personal 
h f "d . l t· h" 
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interests and the interests of the oth e r party tote i uciary r e a ions ip. 
However, a more lenie nt approach is gaining increasing acceptance . This 
appr oach is to e x amin~ t h e facts of the individual case and only to penalise 
t h e fiduciary whe r e there has resulte d, on the facts as they occurred, a s e rious 
conflict b etween their duty and interest.
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Perhaps the most recent decision that best epitomizes the distinction 
between the two attitudes is the well -known ma j ority decision (by three to two) 
h
. 86 
of the House of Lords in Boardman v. P ipps. Brie fly the facts were that a 
solicitor to a trust (Boardman) suggested to the trustee that the trust increase 
their investment in a company from a minority to a majority holding. He was 
told that this was out of the question . Boardman and another then negotiated 
for the takeover of the company themselves. In the negotiations Boardman had 
purported to represent the trust, and thus obtained information that would not 
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have been available to the public in general. Using this information hc made 
a vast profit for himself and his partner, but also for the trust. It was 
claimed that this profit was made by using information obtained by Boardman, 
while acting on behalf of the trust, and so in a fiduciary capacity. The 
majority of the House of Lords took two approaches - that the infonnation was 
either trust property, and there had been speculation with it; or it was 
information acquired in a fiduciary capacity, and could not be used to make 
a personal profit. Thus, because there was a theoretical possibility of a 
conflict of interest, the defendants were liable to account for any profits 
from that infonnation under a constructive trust imposed on them. The minority 
looked in detail at the facts and decided that because a conflict of interest 
had not in fact occurred and had been highly unli~ely the defendants had not 
breached their duty of loyalty to the trust. 
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In the recent decision of Queensland Mines v. Hudson , on appeal from the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales, the Privy Council held, after a detailed 
examination of the circumstances, that the defendant was not in breach of his 
fiduciary duty. By not applying a strict penal rule, the Privy Council has 
indicated that, in fu : ure, it is likely that the type of approach taken by the 
minority in Boardman v. Phipps will be generally adopted. The trend in this 
area of constructive trusts is increasingly to have regard to the facts concerning 
the knowledge and intention of the parties, rather than relying on an absolute 
liability. 
Constructive trusts imposed on strangers is a category of constructive 
t t th t h d t d t · t h to 11·ab1·11·ty.
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rus a as never a op e as ric approac In the case of 
fiduciaries the strict approach in the area of constructive trusts has possibly 
been because this is a class of people with special duties and subject to a 
heavy burden. In view of this, it is suggested that the decision in Re Bell 
cannot be meaningfully compared with trends in a class of constructive trust 
that is developing from a strict liability approach towards an approach that, 
after a consideration of the facts of the case, calls for a decision as to 
whether there has been a significant conflict of duty and interest. 
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B. Constructive Trusls i mposed on S Lrange rs t o the Trust Fund 
A strong argwnent can be made in this area of constructive trusts that 
lhe lrend has been to concentrate on the need to de fine the circumstances in 
which it is jusl to hold the defendant liable. A central issue , as has been 
seen, is whether a stranger dealing with trust property in breach of trust 
must have actual knowl e dge of that bre ach be fore he can be subjected to a 
constructive trust, or whether constructive knowledge is sufficient. The 
fundamental nature of such an issue cannot be denied, and it does demonstrate 
the deep concern to define the requisite state of mind for imposition of the 
constructive trust. However the circumstances in which the controversy arose 
are of interest. 
The two cases at the centre of the debate are Selangor and Karak Rubber Co •• 
In both cases a bank acting as agent had, without being aware of the fact, 
enabled an individual unlawfully to buy the plaintiff company with its own 
money. Once the true facts became known an action was brought against, inter 
alios, the bank, claiming replacement of the cheque used to buy its own shares. 
The amounts involved were formidable, and hence the action was brought against 
the bank in each case. Faced with such substantial claims, to the Court the 
question must have loomed very large as to where the loss should fall. 
Constructive trusts were imposed on various people involved in the events, but 
it was unlikely that the s e would ensure that ~he company in each case was fully 
compensated. The District Bank Ltd.in the Selangor case, and Barclays Bank in 
Karak Rubber Co. were able to bear some of the loss. It is suggested that the 
need to compensate the company that had suffe r ed the initial loss was very 
influential in the decision to impose constructive trusts on the banks, which 
in both cases had constructive knowledge of the breache s of trust, but not actual 
knowledge. The conflicting statements in some later cases
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would indicate that 
these two cases might well have gone too far in compensating the person who 
had suffered loss at the expense of the need to justify liability of the defendant. 
These two cases have been discussed in an attempt to demonstrate that the 
prominance of the dispute as to knowledge required does not show that the need to 
34. 
justify the liability of the defe ndant is the dominnnt f~ctor. Rather, the y 
demonstrate that the argument is as to where the balance should be drawn between 
the need to compensate the victim, and the need to show that, because of the 
circumstances of the case, justice requires that the defendant be rendered 
1 . bl It h ld b 11 d th t 1 · th · t· 9o ia e. sou e reca e a ear ier au ori ies were based on the 
proposition that this type of constructive trust could only be imposed on a 
person who had actual knowledge of a breach of trust. The law was clear. 
The law now appears to be that in the ''knowing receipt or dealing" category 
constructive knowledge is sufficient; and constructive knowledge is possibly 
sufficient in the "knowing assistance" category. The law is now uncertain 
in this area. The confusion now dominant, which is as a result of Selangor 
and subsequent cases, reveals a trend to reduce the state of knowledge 
required to render the defendant liable, as increasing emphasis is placed on 
the need to compensate the person who has suffered loss. 
C. General Equitable Remedy? 
1. The constructive trust and the existence of property over which 
the constructive trust can be imposed: 
An interesting technical point arises as to whether it is required that 
property be vested or ever have been vested in the constructive trustee. If 
the constructive trust is of the same nature as the express trust then it gives 
. ht 91 rise to proprietary rig s. On a traditional view the re can be no imposition 
of a constructive trust if there is no property held by the person that the 
Court purports to make constructive truste~. If the p e rson on whom it is 
sought to impose a constructive trust has disposed of the property then he 
cannot after that time be a constructive trustee of that property - at least 
if that tenn has a traditional meaning. 
No real problem arises if the persun from whom recovery is sought has at 
some stage received the property. The explanation is that, when the transferee 
or agent received the property, he became constructive trustee of it.
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Having disposed of any traceable fonn of the property, he can no longer be a 
35. 
constructive trustee. Rather he becomes personally liable to account.
93 
Just 
as an express lrustee will be personally liable for his loss or disposal of trust 
property, so too will a constructive trustee be personally liable if the 
circumstances are such that he can be fixed with "knowledge" of his breach of 
trust . If is difficult to see how else the personal liability to account can 
be explained except that at some stage the transferee or agent became constructive 
trustee . 
A problem arises however if the person whom it is sought to make liable 
as constructive trustee has never received or held any relevant property. The 
category of "knowing assistance in a dishonest design" seems to comtemplate 
this . It would appear that there are no cases decided on this point. As 
indicated earlier, in every decided case, even in the "knowing assistance" 
category , there has been a receipt of the trust fund at some time by the person 
held liable as constructive trustee . 
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If liability as constructive trustee 
would be imposed without the person ever receiving the trust property, then 
that would be to call something a constructive trust that really does not have 
the characteristics of a trust . Given a trend of increasing emphasis on 
compensation of the victim in the field of constructive trusts, it is quite 
possible that liability would be imposed in this situation . If this is the 
case an important question then arises: is the constructive trust a general 
e quiteble r emedy, which is being inpo sed to create a purely personal liability, 
and being branded by a traditional label so as not to be termed novel? 
2 . Constructive trusts imposed as a result of fraudulent, unconscionable 
or ineguitable conduct 
Traditionally in this area of constructive trusts only fraudulent or 
unconscionable conduct has led to the imposition of a constructive trust . A 
constructive trust is imposed upon property which a person tries to retain for 
himself by fraudulently or unconscionably taking advantage of statutory 
provisions or other fundamental legal principles . Such a person will hold the 
property for those to whose d is~dvantage such provisions or principles would 
other wise operate . Lord Denning M. R. 95 has sugge s ted that there is now a new 
36. 
type of constructive trust that can be imposed where there is inequitable 
conduct in relation to the victim. 96 In Hussey v. Palmer he stalPd: 
[A constructive trust] is a trust imposed whenever justice and good 
conscience require it. It is a liberal process founded on large principles 
of equity, to be applied in cases where the defendant cannot conscientiously 
keep the property for himself alone, but ought to allow another to have the 
property or a share in it ••• It is an equitable remedy by which the court 
can enable an aggrieved party to obtain restitution. 
The development has been treated by several textwriters as an extension of 
the situation of constructive trusts imposed as a result of fraudulent or 
unconscionable conduct and as not effecting other areas such as constructive 
trusts imposed on fiduciaries and strangers.
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However, it is suggested that 
this development has the potential to cut across all categories developed in 
English law and to form the basis of a ge neral equitable remedy for unjust 
enrichment on a similar basis as in America. This clearly has not happened yet 
and must be very carefully considered before any such step is taken. A discussion 
of the arguments on this point cannot be undertaken here. This development is 
introduced here to show another area of constructive trusts where, as a result 
of widening the sphere of liability, the trend is clearly towards compensating 
the person who has suffered. 
D. Re Bell and the trends 
It is submitted that this brief examination of the recent developments in 
the area of constructive trusts demonstrates a trend of increasing emphasis 
on the need to compensate the person who has suffered loss, rather than on the 
need to ensure that there is some element in the circumstances of the case that, 
in justice, requires the liability of the defendant. It is suggested that this 
trend has gone too far. In the ''knowing receipt or dealing" and "knowing 
assistance" categories constructive trusts should only be imposed on transferees 
and agents if they have actual knowledge that their receipt or dealing with the 
property has been in breach of trust.
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Having criticised the recent trend, it is suggested that this trend is, 
nevertheless, unrelated to the liability, that has been proposed, of H's 
37. 
partners in Re B~ll. The recent trend has been an increase in the situations 
in which compensation is allowed to the person who has suffered loss, as a 
result of allowing the Lnposition of construclive trusts where lhe defendant 
has only conslructive knowledge of a breach of trust. However the suggested 
liability of H's partner in Re Bell is founded quite apart from any question 
of knowledge of a breach of trust,constructive or otherwise. Rather, the 
acts of H were acts for which the partnership was resp .:msible, because H 
acted as an agent of the partnership and within the scope of his implied 
authority from the partnership. There are few circumstances that would give 
rise to liability as constructive trustees based on "implied authority" and 
regardless of any actual or constructive notice of a breach of trust. The 
suggested liability is as a result of the special situation of the partnership 
and is justified by the insurance principle previously discussed. Thus, the 
liability of H's partners in Re Bell stands outside the general trends in 
constructive trusts. 
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VI. SUMMARY 
Three tasks have been attempted in this paper: ( 1) a consideration of the 
authoritative basis of Re Bell; (2) an examination of the decision in the context 
of constructive trusts imposed on strangers and agents; (3) a comparison of the 
suggested result in Re Bell with recent trends in the whole field of constructive 
trusts. 
(1) It is submitted that Re Bell is, in principle, consistent with Blyth v. 
Fladgate and Mara v. Browne. However the level at which the test of "implied 
authority" is used in Re Bell does cause some difficulty. To state that a 
partner never has the implied authority of the partnership to constitute 
himself a constructive trustee is to preclude an examination of the facts of 
the case. On examination of the facts and application of the "implied authority" 
test to the circumstances, it is suggested that H's partner should have been 
held liable. 
(2) Placing Re Bell in the context of construccive trusts imposed on strangers 
and agents, demonstrates the inconsistencies in the categorisation and measure 
of liability of constructive trusts in this area. It is submitted that, 
whether the facts of a case place it within the so-called "knowing receipt or 
dealing" category or within the "knowing assistance" category, actual knowledge 
of a breach of trust must exist before a constructive trust is imposed. 
(3) It is suggested that the trend in the field of constructive trusts generally 
is towards increasing emphasis on the need to compensate the person who has 
suffered loss. This has been achieved by a more easily satisfied test of the 
knowledge required to render the defendant liable. The suggested result in 
Re Bell as it is based on a test of implied authority in the specific context 
of a partnership stands outside that general trend. 
A final comment should be made on Lord Denning's attempted creation of a 
"new model constructive trust". The House of Lords has stated, in the cases of 
Gissing v. Gissing
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and Pettitt v. Pettitt
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that questions of equitable 
ownership of property have to be determined in accordance with equitable principles 
relating to trusts and not with what a judge thinks is "fair" in the circumstances. 
39. 
A criticism of the "new model constructive trust" as a gent-ral eciuitable ren1edy 
in English or New Zealand law can thus be seen in the words of Mcthon J. in 
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Carly v. Farrelly 1 
['lhis is] a supposed rule of equity which is not only vague in its outline 
but which must disqualify itself from acceptance as a valid princip]e of 
jurisprudence by its total uncertainty of application and result. It 
cannot be sufficient to say that wide and varying notions of fairness 
and conscience shall be the legal determinant . No stable system of 
jurisprudence could permit a litigants claim to justice to be consigned 
to the formless void of individual moral opinion . 
. 11 102 This may we be so . But if the law of constructive trusts is to 
continue to develop by separation and definition of categories it must be 
ensured that there is some measure of consistency in principle and policy in 
forming the outline of those categories. 
1. [1891] 1 Ch. 337 
2. [ 1896] 1- Ch. 199 
3. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1217 
4. There are some difficulties with this assertion. It may be better to view 
the resulting and implied trusts as synonymous (see A.J. Oakley, Constructive 
Trusts, p. 9). It may al s o be th a t s ecret trusts arP be st tre ale d as a 
s eparate type. These problems are not destructive of the prese nt classifica-
tion as this is used purely to introduce the body of law that is to be 
discussed. 
5. For the source of this discussion see A.J. Oakley, Constructive Trusts, p. 8-9 
6. The firm receiving payment for his servic es. 
7. 1888 unreported 
8. supra n. 1, p. 352 
9. ibid' p. 351 
10. Per Smith L.J •' supra n. 2' p. 209 
11. citing as authority Barnes v. Addy (1874) L .1<. C.h.Ap;:,- 2..q,q. 
12. [1895] 2 Gh. 69 
13. Per Lord Herschell, supra n. 2' p. 208 
14. supra n. 3, p. 1230 
15. Stirling J. states, supra n. 1 p. 352, that the knowledge imputed to the 
partners (and hence the actual knowledge of S) was that: (i) the security 
was of an unsuitable character for trust funds; and (ii) the invesanent was 
not one that the trustees of the settlement could properly sanction. He 
then states that a breach of trust was committed. From these statements it 
is concluded that S knew tha t the inve stme nts made we re in breach of trust . 
16. Per Lord Herschell, supra n. 2, p. 205 . The re c e rtainly was no finding 
of negligence for constructive notic e purposes. 
17. Per Smith L.J., supra n. 2 , p. 209 
18. This seems to be the view of Paul Matthews, Inte rmeddle rs as Constructive 
Trustees, [ 1981] New L.J. 243 
19. And for that matter the decision in Re Bell 
20. supra n. 8 
21. supra n. 3, p. 1228 
22. Per Stirling J. supra n. 1, p. 351: "All the partners knew or were affected 
with the knowledge that those bills formed part of the funds subject to 
the set llement." 
[ 1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555, 1579 
24 . [ 19,5] 1 W.L.R. 1240, 124 7 
?5 . This act being thP inv~stment in breach of trust . 
26 . For a discussion of this see part III B 2. 
27 . Nathan and Marshall, Cases and Commentary on the Law of Trusts (7th ed .), 
p. 664-6. Cases cited as authority for this proposition are , inte r alia 
Chambers v . Minch i. ""l (1802) 7 Ve s. 186 ; Shipbook v. Hinchinbrook (1810) 
16 Ves. 4 77 
28 . Although there we r e trustees of lhe fund, AR who approved his actions was 
not one of them. This also assumes that because AR was not validly 
appointed a t rustee but was an intermeddler that HB would be rendered 
liable. Howeve r note that in Mara Lord Herschell , obit-er, expressed an 
opinion t o the contrary - supra n. 2, p. 207 
29 . However the account into which the money was r eceived must play a role in 
determining whether the partne r was acting in the course of business of 
the firm and whether there was a receipt by the firm. For instance if the 
partner r eceives the trust money into his private account, this may enable 
the court to find that he was not acting in the course of business 
of the partnership. It will, of c ourse, not be conclusive. 
30 . In New Zealand the Partnership Act 1908. 
31 . The state of knowledge required is discussed later. 
32 . In New Zealand s. 13 and 14 of the Partnership Act 1908 . 
33. supra n. 12, p. 94 
34 . supra n. 3, p. 1230 
35 . supra n. 1, p. 352 
36 . Bowstead on Agency (14th ed.) Art. 77, p. 230. Ac tual authority in the 
quotation has been defined earlie r in the text to mean express actual 
authority and implied actual authority. But note that wher e the act done 
by the agent falls entirely outside the scope of his authority, the principal 
will not be responsible. 
37. The obiter statement of the Court of Appeal in Mara and the s tatement of 
Vinelott J. in Re Bell in form appear to be propositio~of law. 
An analysis on first principles as to whether the extent of 
"implied authority", for the purpose of imposing a constructive trust, is 
a question of fact or of law has been beyond the scope of this paper. It 
is submitted that in the area of constructive trusts, as in the law of 
partnership and the general law of principal and agent, the scope of a 
person's "implied aulhority" for the purpose of founding vicarious 
liability is a question of fact. Otago Aero Club (Inc.) v. Stevenson Ltd. 
[1957] N.Z.L.R. 471 is an ex~nple of a case in the field of master and 
servant relationships where Lhe scope of ostensible authority of the 
servant was detennined as a question of fact. Furthermor( it is implicit 
in the analysis of implied authority conducted in Bowstead on Agency (14th ed) 
that implied authority is a question of fact. Having considered a number 
of specific circumstances in which authority is generally implied it is then 
stated that every agent has in addition "such authority as is to be inferred 
from the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case" (Art. 32, 
p. 93). 
38 . supra n. 30 
39 . S. 10 reads as follows: "Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner 
acting in the ordinary course of business of the firm, or with the authority 
of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person not being a 
partner in the firm, or any penalty incurred, the firm is liable therefore 
II 
to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. 
40. North J. in Mara does mention the sections in passing - supra n. 12 , p. 86 
41. The term "apparent authority" is based on the doctrine of estoppel . 
Included within the authority that a partner has is the situation where a 
firm has allowed a person to "appear" to have more authority than he 
possessed infact. 
42. Alternatively it is submitted that liability can be founded under section 
11(a) in that H was acting within the scope of his implied authority in 
receiving and dealing with the fund. The argument is the same as that 
made for imposing liability on H's partner as constructive trustee because 
H was acting within the implied authority of the firm. 
43. The applicability of this branch of Partnership law can be seen in Ex parte 
Biddulph, 3 De Q$ and Sm, 587 where trust money in the hands of a firm of 
bankers was drawn out and misapplied by one of the firm, and it was held 
that all the partners were liable to make it good. 
44. Bys. 12 of the Partnership Act 1890 (U .K.). For a similar analysis of 
s. 11 (b) see Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts p. 120-1 
45. A.J. Oakley, Constructive Trusts, p. 82-3. No case has, however, mentioned 
this section. 
46. S. 16 of the New Zealand Act. 
47. supra n. 45, p. 83 
48. For categorisations used by various text writers see: Nathan and Marshall, 
Cases and Commentary on thf· Lnw of Trusts (7th E:d . ); P ltit , Er:uity and th,~ 
Law of Trusts (4Lh ~d .); Underhill, L~w of Trusts and Trustees (J~lh 0d.); 
Hanbury and M.;,udsley, Modern Equily (10th ed.); A.J. Oakley, Construc tive 
Trusts 
49. supra n. 2, p. 209 
50. See Ungoed - Thomas J. in Selangor United Rubber Estates v. Cradock (no. 3) 
[1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555, 1579 
51. Constructive knowledge as being sufficient for liability in this calegory is 
supported by the t exts and some case law - see Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. v. 
Burden (no. 2) [1972] 1 All E.R. 1210; Nelson v. Larholt [1948] 1 K.B. 339; 
Belmont Finance v. Williams Furniture Ltd. (no. 2) [1980] 1 All E.R. 393. 
52. see the Property Law Act 1952 (N.Z.) 
53. Support for these two branches is to be found in Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. 
supra n. 51, p. 1234. Although only enunciated in one case this division 
has found widespread support amongst textwriters - see Hanbury and Maudsley, 
supra n. 48, p. 315; Nathan and Marshall supra n. 48, p. 412; Underhill 
supra n. 48, p. 331; Pettit supra n. 48, p. 129. 
54. supra n. 50 
55. The directors of the company being in the same position as trustees. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
supra n. 51 
[1969] 2 Ch. 276 
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 1240 
[1978] 3 W.L.R. 712 
Supra n.11, p.244. 
[1942] 1 Ch. 219 
supra n. 60, p. 251 
supra n. 61, P• 228 
In Se langor supra n. 50, p. 1581 Ung oe.a - Thomas J. states that Barnes v. 
Addy is not conclusive on the measure of knowledge required. But in t he 
quote from Lord Selborne's judgement (supra n. 62) use of words "persons 
dealing hone stly as agents" seem s to make cl e ar that constructive knowl edge 
is insufficient. 
65. supra n. 3, p. 1224 
66. ibid, p. 1223 (B-C) 
67. H had actual knowledge of the breach of trust as shown by a letter from H 
to A's mother referred to in Lhe judgment (supra n. 3, p. 1231 (c)). The 
constructive trust thus aro s e on H from the rcce ipl of the proceeds of s a le. 
It can be argue d that he was acting wilhin his implied aulhority in rec eiving 
the money on behalf of a clie nt. If this is so the n the whole firm became 
constructive truste es of th~ proce eds of sale from the time of rece ipt of 
that money. By analogy with Blyth it can be argue d that whe n H misapplied 
that money in breach of trust the whole firm b e came automatically liable 
to account for the proceeds of sale. 
68. as it was with at least part of the fund in Re Bell. 
69. There is some uncertainty in the law on this point. 
70. Dicta in Carl-Zeiss Stiftung supra n. 57, suggest that actual knowledge is 
needed for both categories. As a statement of what the law currently is 
this seems untenable bearing in mind the decision in Belmont Finance Corp. 
v. Williams Furniture Ltd. (no. 2) supra n. 51. 
71. If the trust is of a proprietary nature, there would be a major conceptual 
difficulty in imposing a constructive trust on someone who had not received 
the trust property. 
72. see Hanbury and Maudsley supra n. 48, p. 314 
73. (1873) L.R. 15 Eq. 204 
74. supra n. 51, p. 1234. Nelson v. Larholt supra n. 51 is also said to 
support the same proposition. 
75. supra n. 51 
76. Constructive Trusts, p. 70-2 
77. Barnes v. Addy supra n. 60; Williams v. Williams(1881) 17 Ch. D. 437; 
Re Blundell(1888} 40 Ch. D. 370; Williams - Ashman v. Price and Williams 
supra n. 61 
78. Per Lord Selborne, supra n. 62 
79. i.e. a transferee without value and without notice. 
80. Re Diplock [1948] eh. 465 
81. See A.J. Oakley, "The Prerequisi ties of an Equitable Tracing Claim", 
Current Legal Problems(1975), p. 64. Any need for a fiduciary relationship 
or constructive trust before an equitable tracing claim may be founded is 
refuted. By use of the authorities of Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398; 
Banque Belge pour l'Etranger v. Hambrouck [1920] 1 K.B. 321 Oakley esta-
blishes that " the only p r erequisite of an equitable tracing claim is an 
equitable proprietary interest in the property in question. A fiduciary 
relationship, in the sense of an obligation to exhibit an especial duty of 
good faith, does not of itself create any right in a party to that 
relationship to trace property either at law or in equity - such a right 
only arises whPre a pro ri~tary interest is found to exist in the 
party seeking to trace . " (p . 82) 
82 . As to the proceeds of the farm the constructive trusteeship of H should 
have been founo~d m the "knowing receipt or dealing" category . However , 
if the test of kn()\,,lledge is the same in both categories , then the strict 
categorization becomes irrelevant . 
83 . Re Bell falls in the second class of case . 
84 . Two examples of the application of this strict penal rule are the cases 
o f Ex parte Lacy (1802) 6 Veysey 625 where a trustee purchased trust 
property; and Keech v . Sandford (1726) Sel . Cas . Ch . 61 where a 
fiduciary entered into a transaction with a third party in his pers nal 
capacity when he should have done so on behalf of his principal . 
85. ~ee Holder v . Holder [ 1968] en. 353; Re Cape Breton Co . (1885) 29 Ch . D. 
795 ; and Re Thomson [ 1930] 1 Ch. 203 
86. [ 1967] 2 A. C . 46 
87 . (1978) 52 A. L . J . R. 399 
88 . s ee the earlier cases of Blyth and Mara 
89 . Carl - Zeiss Stiftung s upra n . 57 ; Competitive Insura ice Co., supra n . 58; 
Belmont Finance supra n . 59 
90 . Supra n . 77 . 
91 . The whole concept of trust law is concerned with interests in property . 
If the constructive trust does not need this element , then to call it 
a trust i s really a misnomer . 
92 . or if the constructive trust arises only on the act of disposal -
in s tantaneously became a constructive trustee and , after disposal , 
liable to account . 
93 . To refe r to a person who no longer has the trust property as liable as 
con s tructive trustee - as has been done on occasions in this paper -
may well be convenient but it is technically incorrect . Such a person -
a s wa s t h e case i n Re Bell - is liable to account in a personal action , 
but can no longer be a constructive trustee , as he does not have the 
property concerned . 
94 . Selangor and Karak Rubber perhaps come closest to the agent not having 
r eceived the proper ty . Yet even there it can be said that the agent 
r eceived t h e trust fund before transferring it on . 
95 . see for example the ccses of Hussey v . Palner [ 1972] 3 All E . R. 744 ; 
Eves v. Ev e s [ 1975] 3 All E.R. 7G8; Cook e v. He ad [ 1972]? All E.R. 38; 
He seltine v. He seltine [ ~971] 1 All E.R. 952 
96. supra n. 95, p. 747 
97. see for e xample A.J. Oakley, Constructive Trusts 
98. Although a de tailed analysis has no t been und e rtake n he re, it is 
suggested that, in order to be consiste nt, the attempts of Lord 
Denning M.R. t o e x t end an existing c a tegory to inequitable c onduct 
should b e s e t aside, and the c nnstructive trust only b e i mposed as 
a result of fraudulent and unconscionable conduct. 
99. [1971] A.C. 886 
100. [1970] A.C. 777 
101. [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 356 
102. Fo r a further stat~nent of Mahon J. 's view see Avondale Printers and 
Stationers Ltd. v. Haggle [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 124. For a different view 
of the effect of introduction of u n just enrichment and just what is 
meant by that term see the note by Professor L. McKay "Avondale 
Printers v. Haggie: Mr Justice Mahon and the Law of Restitution" 
LI q g oJ \l. :z.. L. ~- 24-S:: 
Patterson, na,id 
Folder Constructive 
Pa trusts and Re 
Bell's Indenture 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. 
VI 111111i1i1i11ii r1i l1ii1
1
1r1y1 11111 1i111;1 r r1i 1 r1 ir 11i1i1i1i1r 
3 7212 00364449 7 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
